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ECONOMICS AS A SCIENCE:
ROBERT NELSON'S ECONOMICS AS
RELIGION
t
Thomas S. Ulen
I. INTRODUCTION

Several years ago a colleague in the Department of Religious
Studies asked me to participate in a roundtable discussion of
environmental policy issues. There were many distinguished participants (and me) from a wide range of scholarly disciplines-the
biological sciences, ecology, civil engineering, environmental sciences, religious studies, and law, among others. Most of them, I later
found out, were not only prominent scholars, but also activists on
behalf of environmental causes. I had been invited principally in my
capacity as an economist (and as a member of the disparate faculty
then organized into something, now extinct, called the "Institute for
Environmental Studies"). The roundtable participants had all read the
same set of materials and gathered for an unstructured discussion of
those materials.
During an early session, we looked at the issue of endangered species.' There was a lot of emotion-not rending of clothes, wailing,
gnashing of teeth, and pulling out tufts of hair, but close to all of
those--exhibited by those who felt strongly that those species in danger of extinction should be protected, at almost any cost. I played my
part in this drama as the unwitting villain. I raised the possibility that
the costs of preserving certain species might exceed the benefits. I
even raised the possibility that the benefits were difficult to quantify
t Swanlund Chair, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law; and Director of the Illinois Program in Law and Economics.
I am very grateful to Andy Morriss for his invitation to participate in this appreciation of
Professor Nelson's work. I also want to thank Christina Garcia, University of Michigan School
of Medicine Class of 2010, and Bryan Deaton, University of Illinois College of Law Class of
2006, for their marvelous research assistance.
I See Gardner M. Brown, Jr., & Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species
Act, J. ECON. PERSP. 1,3 (1998) (providing an economic view of the Endangered Species Act).
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and, probably, not very large. A hush-not, let it be said, a rapt
hush-fell over the room. Undaunted, I proceeded to make the argument that humankind ought to be the measure of all things and that
benefits to humankind surely had to weigh more heavily than benefits
to nonhumans (even including the values that humans put on nonhumans). It is difficult to characterize the nature of silence, but my sense
was that the hush had clearly passed from being a shocked but respectful hush
into a stunned silence that seemed to scream, "Who let
2
him in?"
I will not belabor this experience. What struck me so forcefully
was that I thought (and still think) that my training as an economist
equipped me to ask relevant questions that the others had not only not
asked and answered, but had never thought to ask. I thought then, and
still devoutly believe, that cost-benefit questions are the central questions to ask about environmental issues (and about almost every other
public policy issue). I am not certain how far I would push this view.
I do not believe, for example, that I would maintain that the economist's way of looking at the value of endangered species is the only
meaningful way to evaluate that issue. And cost-benefit analysis,
however useful, might give way to more deontological inquiry with
respect to some important public policy debates. 3 But I would be willing to assert that the economist's method was the most relevant
method of making that difficult evaluation-that it is a better method
than mere assertion, appeals to revelation or political power, resort to
polling data, philosophical paeans to the environment and its diversity, and so on.
I kept thinking of this episode as I read through Robert Nelson's
Economics as Religion. As I shall indicate shortly, there are parts of
this book that I admire a great deal, but there are also parts with
which I take deep issue. As an economist who has spent the vast bulk
of his career among extremely bright and articulate noneconomists, I
am accustomed to criticisms of the field of economics and used to
defending it. It is doubly disconcerting to have the criticisms made by
an initiate into the mysteries of economics and for those criticisms to
sound distressingly like the loopier of the criticisms that I hear from
my noneconomist colleagues.
Professor Nelson's claim is that the most fruitful manner in which
to view the modem economics profession and its core learning is as a
2 Professor Nelson captures the fanatical religious fervor of environmentalists perfectly in
his section, "Environmental Calvinism," in Economics as Religion. ROBERT H. NELSON,

ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO CICAGO AND BEYOND 308-13 (2001).

3 I am grateful to my colleague and mentor in these matters, Larry Solum, for discussion
on this point. See Lawrence B. Solum, Public Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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theology. The field of economics should not contend, as those learned
in that field frequently do, that their discipline is a science-indeed,
the Queen of the social sciences.
I respectfully and profoundly disagree. My strong belief is that
there is much more to the field of economics than millenarian pronouncements. I believe that the scientific claims of economics are
strong and demonstrable. In what follows, I shall attempt to defend
my view over that of Professor Nelson.
The next section lays out Professor Nelson's claim very briefly
and, I hope, fairly. Then I turn to my criticism of his claim through
looking at the impact of economics on the study of law. I think that
the application of economic thinking to the analysis of legal issues
beautifully illustrates what is off-base with Professor Nelson's contention. Those who have been devoutly opposed to economic thinking
in law have unwittingly taken up Professor Nelson's flag and
marched under it, while those who champion law-and-economics do
so in no small part because of their belief that economics brings a
much-needed scientific methodology to the study of law.
II. NELSON'S ARGUMENT
Professor Nelson's claim is that there is a millenarian streak running through the modem field of economics. No one could miss this
streak in the work of Karl Marx in the mid- and later nineteenth century. What is new and interesting in Professor Nelson's claim is his
contention that that religious streak is evident in the work of such
modem giants as John Maynard Keynes, Paul Samuelson, Frank
Knight, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Gary Becker, Richard Posner, Ronald Coase, and the New Institutional Economists.
By "millenarian" I mean (and think that Professor Nelson means)
some grand normative statements that have an apocalyptic ring and
import to them. And the heart of Professor Nelson's criticism of these
statements is, I believe, twofold: (1) there is no empirical or descriptive basis for the millenarian pronouncements, and perhaps worse, (2)
economists contend that there is a scientific basis for their statements.
Indeed, my sense is that it is this hypocritical passing off of baldly
normative statements as if they had a scientific warrant that most irks
Professor Nelson.
To illustrate the argument, consider what Professor Nelson says
about Paul Samuelson, one of the giants of modern economic theory
and an early winner of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. He
characterizes Samuelson as a prophet for the Progressive "gospel of
efficiency."
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The problem is that this image of the market mechanism of
[Samuelson's] Economics is more poetry than science. It is
best understood as a compelling metaphor for its time designed to attract converts to a new understanding of the progressive gospel of efficiency.... In retrospect, as in Marxism

and other systems of economic thought before it, the greatest
attraction of Economics was its underlying inspirational message. 4
And later:
It is instead the religious duty of all good citizens of our time
to bear the sacrifices of economic progress without complaint. Hence, for example, if asked to move to another job in
another city, to live away from their families, to see the character of their neighborhoods changed by development, to lose
the remaining wild areas of the countryside, or to bear other
burdens for progress, they should instead rejoice in the fact of
their opportunity to participate in the achievement of a future
heaven on earth. In this way, all of humankind will soon
enough experience a transformation of the human condition,
5
and the temporary burdens of the past will soon be forgotten.
This Progressive gospel was to have economists serving, literally,
as its high priests:
Samuelson followed the Roman Catholic model. The members of the economics profession, and other scientific and
professional elites, would be motivated by the higher considerations of a priesthood, as compared with businesspeople
and other ordinary citizens in the commercial realm. There
would be no popular votes held for the scientific leaders of
society. Samuelson acknowledged the practical necessity to
allow wide rein for the pursuit of self-interest in the marketplace. However, the professional economists and other scientific managers of the progressive state would function according to the ethical standard of the Roman Catholic priesthood.
They would reject the commercial motive of self-interest and
instead act in their professional and public capacity to serve
the common good--"the public interest"-of all of society.6
4 NELSON, supranote 2, at 58.
5 Id. at 70.
6

Id. at 99-100.
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Moving to the Chicago school, Professor Nelson characterizes
Knight, Friedman, Stigler, and Becker as having, ultimately, an antiProgressive agenda. They enlisted their economic thinking to further
this agenda. According to Nelson, the Chicago school explored the
socially desirable results of (lightly) regulated individual self-interest,
pushing morality, love, shared community values, and all other extrinsic motivations for behavior out of the picture:
In pushing the motive of pursuit of individual advantage to its
logical extreme, Becker, Posner, and other Chicago school
economists of their ilk are in effect preaching a new secular
religion. In Christian religion... everything that happens in
the world is said to be controlled by God. Now in the Chicago
project . . . everything is controlled by economic forces of

self-interest. The place of the Christian God in explaining the
workings of the world has been taken by the workings of the
economic drive for individual gain (broadly conceived). 7
And just a bit later:
In a virtual miracle, the Chicago school may just happen to
be-among all the many messengers on earth that would have
been available to God-the chosen vessel for a new revelation to humankind. It has supplanted the outmoded (in language and substance) instructions of the Ten Commandments
and other messages of the Christian Bible. In every area of
life, men and women do-and should, as is also the implicit
message-these things that will serve to maximize their individual well-being.8
Professor Nelson's investigation of Ronald Coase and the New Institutional Economics finds similar, but more muted, millenarian
strains. 9
III. A CRITICISM
Before I take issue with some of Professor Nelson's arguments, I
want to identify a point of agreement. I agree with Professor Nelson
that some economists do tend to oversell the policy implications of
their work. There is no contesting the fact that prominent economists
sometimes stray into normative territory without adequately advertis7

Id. at 185.

8 Id. at 186.

9 Id. at 210-12.
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ing to their readers that they have done so and that these normative
statements sometimes have shaky or nonexistent theoretical and empirical foundations. And this can lead uncritical readers to believe that
the economists have "proven" something that is, rather, a matter of
opinion. There are lots of examples of this phenomenon in Economics
as Religion, some of which I have noted in the previous section.
Another example of straying beyond support appears in development policy. In the early 1990s, many developmental economists and
most major development funding organizations in Washington, D.C.,
adopted what has been called the "Washington Consensus" on development policy. The gist of that consensus was to "stabilize, privatize,
and liberalize"-that is, to reduce fiscal deficits, achieve macroeconomic stability, control inflation, open the economy to foreign trade,
eliminate currency overvaluation, transfer public assets to private
hands, and so on.10 I think that Professor Nelson would characterize
the statements made on behalf of the Washington Consensus as being
"religious." But this "religion" has not lasted very long. The vigorous
arguments in favor of this consensus, no matter how convincingly
made, have become very muted. Indeed, a prominent and careful student of development, Dani Rodrik, says, "[I]t is fair to say that nobody really believes in the Washington Consensus anymore."" So,
yes, Professor Nelson is correct: some economists do tend to oversell
the policy implications of their work.
Regardless of our differences, Professor Nelson is to be commended for having written an interesting and almost comprehensive
recent history of economic thought. (I shall explain what I think is
missing in Section III.B below.) His characterization of Samuelson's
attempts to put economics on a scientific basis, of the path-breaking
work of Frank Knight, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, and Gary
Becker of the Chicago school, and of Ronald Coase and the New Institutional Economics are all insightful.
The rest of this section addresses points on which I diverge with
Professor Nelson. First, I make the case that economics is more science than religion. I then turn to some criticisms of Professor Nelson's history of modem economic thought. He has, I believe, omitted
references to some fascinating trends in modem thought that do not fit
his hypothesis very well. And finally, I want to buttress, I hope, my
case for economics as a science by looking at the impact of economic
concepts and methodology on legal scholarship and the study of law.
10Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?, J. ECON.
LITERATURE (forthcoming).

I d. (manuscript at 2).
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A. Economics as a Science
My central criticism of Professor Nelson's thesis is that he has
missed or misrepresented the central thrust of modem economics.
While I cannot dispute the quotations that he ably marshals in support
of his thesis, I do not think that they add up to an indictment of modem economics as being nonscientific.
Indeed, I think that Professor Nelson's argument skates very close
to the edge of plausibility. He strains to fit his reading of events into
his thesis in the same manner that conspiracy theorists find a completely different reality in what the rest of us have taken for granted.
Those theorists take the same events perceived by the rest of us-the
assassination of President Kennedy by Lee Harvey Oswald-and tell
a just-so story that seems to explain the same facts but from a completely different perspective-not the actions of a very troubled loner,
but the manipulation of a Manchurian-candidate-like assassin by the
Cuban government, seeking revenge for CIA attempts on Castro's
life. Or the contention that the magnificent works known to us as the
product of William Shakespeare were not written by the littleeducated son of a provincial glovemaker, but by Edward de Vere, the
17th Earl of Oxford.12
In this vein, Nelson takes excerpts from the works of Karl Marx,
John Maynard Keynes, Paul Samuelson, Frank Knight, and others and
purports to show coherent millenarian themes (not the same themes,
certainly, but all apocalyptic) running through their work. But this is
selective quotation mining. A different set of quotes might-I am
hedging because I have not attempted to put together these quotes
myself--demonstrate that the religious element in the work of these
great economists is minor, while the scientific element is dominant.
Let me briefly put forth the case in favor of economics as a science, not as a religion. The philosophy of science provides an extensive and rich literature on what it means to be a science.' 3 Instead, I
shall concentrate on an unsophisticated but essentially accurate portrait of science, illustrating how science applies to the standard
method of approaching economic questions.
A scientist begins his inquiry into a natural phenomenon in the understanding that she is an empiricist-that the phenomenon she seeks
12 For the Oxfordian case, see MARK ANDERSON, SHAKESPEARE BY ANOTHER NAME: A
BIOGRAPHY OF EDWARD DE VERE, EARL OF OXFORD, THE MAN WHO WAS SHAKESPEARE
(2005). For the more conventional view, see STEPHEN GREENBLATT, WILL IN THE WORLD:
How SHAKESPEARE BECAME SHAKESPEARE (2004).
13 See, e.g., DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS (1990); PHILLIP KITCHER, THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT LEGEND, OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT ILLUSIONS
(1993); ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (2000).
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to explain is measurable and that descriptions and explanations of that
phenomenon must be observable and, eventually, observed. As I mentioned earlier, this view of how to understand the world stands in
stark contrast to the views that intuition, revelation, tradition, power,
and authority reveal descriptions and explanations of real phenomena.
A distinctive aspect of the empiricist method of understanding the
world is the concept of "falsifiability," an idea usually associated with
Sir Karl Popper. 14 A meaningful scientific statement is one that can,
in principle, be proven untrue-can, that is, be falsified. To take Popper's paradigmatic example, the proposition "All swans are white" is
meaningful, because it can be falsified by the observation of a black
swan.
So, a scientific inquiry begins with a falsifiable hypothesis. 15 The
scientist then elaborates on that hypothesis, making it as comprehensive and coherent as she can. She might also indicate what empirical
tests could confirm or refute her hypothesis.
Eventually, for the scientific inquiry to complete a stage, an investigator must confront the hypothesis with data. 16 (This empirical work
does not have to be done by the person who framed the theory that
guided the gathering of data and its statistical testing.) This confrontation confirms or refutes the hypothesis and may raise new questions.
The process then begins anew, with theoretical elaborations on the
result of the previous theory-empirical work stage and subsequent
empirical or experimental work designed to confirm or refute the new
hypothesis.
It is vital to the full understanding of economics as a science to
stress the methodological and procedural aspects of the empiricism
that guides science. Science does not present us with a body of settled
conclusions but with a means of knowing about the world-a means
that stands in stark contrast to divination of animal entrails, prayer,
assertion, tradition, revelation, authority, and the like. Surely there are
questions that have been definitively answered-the earth and nine
or, possibly, ten planets revolve around the sun-but in many instances the questions are open. A community of those learned in the
subject continually explores these questions. While their collective
and cumulative efforts approach closer to the truth, frequently the
truth is just out of reach.

14

See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40-42 (1959).

In the context of law, an example might be, "Switching the default liability standard for
medical injuries from the fault standard to strict liability will increase the cost of medical care."
16 This empirical work does not have to be done by the person who framed the theory that
guided the gathering of data and its statistical testing.
'5
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B. Some Minor Criticisms
One criticism of Professor Nelson's work is that his reading of
modem economic thought is selective and (like that of conspiracy
theorists) biased to foster his particular point of view. Economics as
Religion focuses on several very prominent modem economists or
schools of thought, but the book is not a comprehensive modem history of economic thought. In particular, Professor Nelson says almost
nothing about such prominent modem theorists as Tjalling Koopmans, Gerard Debreu, Michael Spence, George Akerlof, and Joseph
Stiglitz. To be completely fair, Professor Nelson does mention the last
three of this list, but he does so, not to illustrate the linear development of economic theory, but rather to highlight some of the shortcomings of the Chicago school.
Also glaringly absent from Economics as Religion is any mention
of econometrics. At the same time that Paul Samuelson was seeking
to put economics onto a more formal theoretical grounding, other
economists, such as Jan Tinbergen and Simon Kuznets (both Nobel
Prize winners) were trying to develop data and methods of testing that
could subject the formal theory to confirmation or rejection.
The story of the development, refinement, and eventual centrality
of econometrics in modem economic inquiry is missing from
Economics as Religion. This is not merely an oversight; it
significantly biases Professor Nelson's case in his favor. There is very
little that is millenarian about anything that econometricians have
written or are likely to write. Their writings are technical and only
occasionally directed at practical matters. But as an indispensable
complement to the work of the theorists, the work of creating modem
econometrics is one of the most important aspects of modem
economics as a science. 17
C. The Scientific Study of Law
I am extremely mindful of the scientific aspect of economics because of my many years of professing law and economics. To those
unfamiliar with the modem history of legal scholarship, this statement
I7 One might also cite the work of behavioral economists, who use findings from actual
behavior to replace or refine rational choice theory. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Psychology and

Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998) (providing different forms of psychological

evidence to challenge the rationality assumption in economics). If one were sympathetic to
Professor Nelson's view, one might cite the development of behavioral economics as the creation of yet another religious sect. I prefer to see it as a natural progression in economists' attempts to understand human choice. It is a remarkable testament to that view that in 2002 the
selection committee awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics to Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist.
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will seem mysterious. But to those who are aware of the remarkable
changes that have occurred in the legal academy over the past twentyfive years, the connection between the scientific nature of economics
and the study of law will seem obvious. Let me briefly lay out the
connection.
When I first taught the economic analysis of law at the University
of Illinois College of Law in the early 1980s, the notion of beginning
the analysis of a legal issue with a theoretical question was virtually
unknown. Rather, legal analysis began by articulating the prevailing
doctrine on some question of law and then proceeded by showing that
some hypothetical fact scenario could not easily be accommodated to
the existing doctrine (therefore requiring an emendation of the doctrine) or that various jurisdictions had taken incompatible doctrinal
stances on the same question of law (therefore requiring some lightfooted and high-minded reconciliation among the differing doctrines).
These are important tasks for anyone concerned about the law, but
they are not at the heart of modem legal scholarship. At that time, I
was astonished by the dearth of systematic empirical work that could
reinforce all of this doctrinal work. To make matters worse, when
there was empirical work that called doctrine into question, it was
largely ignored.' 8 It was as if professors at medical schools had
opined on the effectiveness of different cures without paying any attention to systematic trials of alternative courses of treatment.
Since the early 1980s, an alternative method of examining the law
has become popular and, arguably, has even grown to become the
default method of legal scholarly analysis. That innovation is known
as law-and-economics or the economic analysis of law. That style of
analysis begins with the economic proposition that economics provides a theory of how decision-makers make choices-not just
choices about explicitly economic choices, such as whether to buy
stocks or bonds, but all choices, including such seemingly noneconomic choices as whether to have another child or whether to comply with a legal rule. By viewing legal decision-makers as making
rational choices, law-and-economics provided a new way of theorizing about how people might respond to the imprecations of the law.
Law-and-economics provided a theory of legal decision-making.
This was the beginning of a scientific way of looking at the law.
Scholars could now hypothesize about how those whose behavior the
law sought to affect might respond to legal rules. But as I indicated
above, providing a theory is only a part of the manner in which sci18 See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work,
and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 876 (2002).
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ence proceeds. The second part-intimately connected with the framing of theory-is empirical work. And there is some evidence to suggest that empirical legal work is increasing.
Let me cite four bits of evidence for the increase in empirical legal
scholarship. In the late 1990s, Professor Robert Ellickson of Yale
Law School published a study of trends in legal scholarship finding
an increase in empirical legal scholarship to be the most easily documentable trend in recent legal scholarship.' 9 Ellickson found that during the period 1994 to 1996 there were six times more references in
legal scholarship to the search term empiric! and all of its permutations than to post-modern! and its permutations, a term he interprets
to be a proxy for skepticism about empirical work.2 ° However, he
found that his indices of empirical and quantitative work were constant from 1982 to 1996. But the indices for the terms statistic! and
significant doubled over the same time period.2 1 From this he concludes that "[t]he data . . . hint[s] that law professors and students
have become more inclined to produce (although not to consume)
quantitative analyses. 22
Second, empirical studies have long been published in the best law
reviews and, of course, in specialty journals, such as the Journal of
Legal Studies and the Journalof Law and Economics. Now, however,
there is a first-rate journal devoted expressly to the topic-the Journal of EmpiricalLegal Studies.23
Third, the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), the on-line
scholarly publishing outlet where an increasing number of scholars
first post their writing, has a subject-area working-paper series in empirical legal studies, edited by Professor Jennifer Arlen of New York
University Law School. 4 Finally, the theme of the January 2006,
Annual Convention of the American Association of Law Schools was
empirical legal scholarship.

19 Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL

STuD. 517 (2000). Ellickson did a search on Westlaw of all documents containing certain key
phrases meant to indicate the style of scholarship that the piece represented. Id.at 528-29, tbl.4.
20 Id. at 528.
21 id.
22 Id.
23 The journal is edited by a distinguished group of law professors at Cornell. One of the
editors, Theodore Eisenberg, is a notable self-taught pioneer in empirical studies of legal topics.
See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability:An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) (using empirical
studies to track changes in judicial decision-making in products liability cases).
24 Experimental
& Empirical
Studies
Legal
Subject
Matter
Journal,
http://www.ssrn.com/lsn (follow "Subject Matter" hyperlink; then follow "Experimental &
Empirical Studies" hyperlink) (last visited May 8, 2006).
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One can explain this change in the nature of legal scholarship by
noting that law-and-economics imported the scientific method of inquiry into the study of the law.2 5 That is, the rise of empirical work is
not something that simply happened coincidentally with other "law
and" developments in legal scholarship. Rather, it occurred as an almost inevitable result of the theories of legal decision-making provided by economics and of the devotion to empiricism and the scientific method that characterize modem economics.
The last point to which I want to draw attention is how the process
aspect of science might apply to this recent pattern of law-andeconomics scholarship. Recall that science is a method of inquiry and
that it continuously approaches a true description and explanation of
natural phenomena. I think that it is this aspect of science as applied
to the study of law that is the least appreciated and most difficult for
doctrinal scholars to accommodate to. Making a bold attempt to push
our understanding of law forward may lead a scholar to make what
seems like an outrageous claim-that, for example, the doctrinal
stance against the routine enforcement of stipulated damages is
wrong. But it is in trying to defend such interesting and bold claims
that significant scholarly advances are to be made. A very wise
scholar once pointed out to me that you do not have to be right in
order to do significant work and be a highly regarded scholar. Simply
making the best theoretical and empirical case for a bold scholarly
position that may ultimately prove incorrect-which is more or less
how Professor Nelson describes much of Gary Becker's work on the
family 2 6 -may cause others to look at the issue in significant new
ways. In this understanding of science, making scholarly mistakesbold, meaningful mistakes-is a vital part of advancement.
As a telling example of this procedural aspect of the scientific inquiry, consider the important work that legal scholars are doing on
behavioral aspects of choice. When economists and lawyers familiar
with economics first started analyzing legal decision-making, the
model of human decision-making that they used was rational choice
theory. That theory holds, in one version, that human beings are flawless calculators of the costs and benefits of the alternatives open to
them at any point in time and choose that alternative that maximizes
their well-being. Part of the initial negative reaction to law-and25 This is a point that I have made in previous work. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and Economics, Law, Other Cognate Disciplines and the Future of Legal

Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 403, 404 (2004) (discussing the trend in legal scholarship
toward a more scientific approach); Ulen, supra note 18, at 876 (discussing recent trends in
legal scholarship).
26Nelson, supra note 2, at 176-84.
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economics was due, I am certain, to skepticism of this account of how
humans make decisions generally, and particularly with respect to
legal choices. This skepticism grew into a distrust of economics and
of theorizing. But those reactions betray a complete misunderstanding
of the scientific method of learning about the world.
The appropriate response to the misunderstanding is to use the scientific method to provide a better theory of decision-making. Some
responded in this more appropriate manner. Rather than reject the
entire enterprise of theorizing about choice, some economists and
legal scholars began to explore systematic deviations from the predictions of rational choice. This literature, referred to generally as "behavioral decision theory," has provided social scientists with new and
important insights27into the analysis of legal (and other) decisionmaking processes.
This process aspect of the scientific inquiry is, perhaps, the most
difficult for doctrinal legal scholars to come to terms with. Their
greatest rewards in school and in practice have come in getting the
correct answer, not in being brilliantly wrong. 28 They are suspicious-perhaps prudently so--of grand theories and overarching explanations of real phenomena. However laudable this extreme skepticism may be in many settings, it is stultifying with respect to scholarly advancement.
Science is collaborative and cumulative: we work on the same
problem or set of problems separately but from the same general
standpoint, and we share our results. Our small advances add up over
time to large understandings. That is the great strength of science as a
method of discovering explanations about real phenomena. Economics more than any other social science has embraced this method of
inquiry, to its great credit and to our great benefit. The marvelous
advances in legal understanding of the past twenty-five years are due
to law-and-economics having imported that same method of inquiry
into the study of law. Moreover, because we are at such an early
phase of the scientific study of legal issues, empirical work has only
just begun. There is much more excitement to come.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have tried here to summarize and criticize Professor Robert Nelson's view that modem economics has an essential religious streak.
27

Ulen, supra note 18.

28 See Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 917 n.1

(1986) (using the term "brilliance" to "refer to new ideas that turn conventional thinking on its
head").
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My central criticism of that contention is that it seems to me to miss
or misrepresent the scientific forest for the millenarian trees. Economists have, of course, made sweeping normative claims for their
learning, but I see these claims as mere puffery rather than the highest
and best statements about the profession. Rather, the heart of economic work over the past seventy-five or so years has been the steady
accretion of understanding through the process of theorizing, subjecting to empirical study, refining the theory in light of empirical results,
performing more empirical work, and so on.
I have tried to show that the importation of economic thinking into
the study of law has begun the same process within legal scholarship-with the same great increase in our understanding, and with the
same promise of explaining much more.
The procedures by which science seeks to understand and explain
the world-procedures whose success in the physical, chemical, and
biological sciences have lately been repeated in the social sciencesare one of the greatest human innovations of the last millennium. As
much as we have learned, there is still much more to be uncovered.

